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Abstract 
 
The data indicate that non-wage labour costs in Germany have reached a record high in recent years. 
From 1972 to 2001, the ratio of non-wage labour costs to direct compensation in West German 
manufacturing industry rose from 55.6% to 81.2%. The topic of non-wage labour costs is increasingly 
being discussed among and between the political parties because non-wage labour costs are likely to 
have major negative effects on employment. We follow the real options approach, which allows us to 
investigate the value to a firm of waiting to adjust labour when the firm´s revenues are stochastic and 
adjustment costs are sunk. Simulation exercises show that the interaction between hiring and firing 
costs, non-wage labour costs and uncertainty can have important ramifications for employment 
dynamics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Non-wage labour costs are the subject of intensive political debate. Payroll taxes drive a wedge 
between the cost of a worker to an employer and the wage received. If wages and prices are relatively 
flexible, high non-wage labour costs are unlikely to have major negative effects on employment in the 
long-run. However, in countries where wages and prices are inflexible, employment will suffer if non-
wage labour costs increase. Many of the job losses will fall on low-paid workers, due among other 
things to the existence of binding wage floors such as legal or collectively-bargained minimum wages. 
Increasing non-wage labour costs also tend to encourage substitution away from labour to more 
capital-intensive methods of production. Therefore, reducing social insurance contributions ranks high 
on the German political agenda.1 
Non-wage labour costs are those categories of the enterprise's total labour costs comprising other than 
direct compensation. Non-wage labour costs account for a very substantial and rising proportion of 
total labour costs. There are several ways of defining non-wage labour costs. The annual analysis of 
non-wage labour costs in Germany by the “Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft” is based on official 
statistics from the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden, which conducts surveys on labour costs 
every four years. The official statistics distinguish between compensation for hours actually worked 
and non-wage labour costs. Non-wage labour costs are differentiated into pay for days not worked, 
special payments, statutory social welfare costs and other non-wage labour costs. The statistics 
differentiate between statutory non-wage labour costs, and non-statutory costs resulting from 
collective bargaining and additional benefits provided by the employer.2 Table 1 below sets out the 
latest aggregate data on the development of wage and non-wage labour costs in West German 
manufacturing industries (see Schröder, 2002a). 
 
Table 1: Annual Labour Costs in West German Manufacturing Industry per Employee in € 
 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1998 2000 2001 
Direct 
Compensation 
7535 9600 11557 13616 15406 17580 21314 24218 25000 26455 27025
Non-Wage 
Labour Costs 
4188 6304 8099 10276 12198 14149 17139 19852 20450 21505 21940
Share of Non- 
Wage Labour 
Costs in % 
55.6 65.7 70.1 75.5 79.2 80.5 80.4 82.0 81.8 81.3 81.2 
 
                                                 
1 Over the last decade, Germany appeared to be unable to reform labour market institutions and the welfare state 
in order to reduce high and rising unemployment rates. In this respect it forms an unholy triple alliance of reform 
laggards with France and Italy (see Minford and Naraidoo, 2002). 
2 However, one should bear in mind that some non-statutory non-wage labour costs - such as holidays - may 
result from the implementation of labour law and additional collective agreements by the social partners. To a 
certain extent these kinds of costs might also be attributed to statutory non-wage labour costs. 
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In West German manufacturing industry, non-wage labour costs reached an all-time high of € 21940 
in 2001.3 From 1972 to 2000, the ratio of non-wage labour costs to direct compensation grew by 25.6 
percentage points to 81.2%. However, this cost dynamic has slowed in recent years. A striking feature 
is that the share of non-wage labour costs is almost constant over the period 1988-2001. For 2003, a 
further rise in non-wage labour costs is predicted. In January 2003, the contribution rates for all types 
of social insurance were raised again and a further increase of statutory social welfare contributions of 
employers is expected for 2004. This means uncertainty for firms about whether and, if so, when a 
further increase is to be expected.  
The disaggregate data in Table 2 indicate that the rise of non-wage labour costs from 1992 to 2001 can 
be attributed to increases in both the statutory and the non-statutory elements. A special role is played 
by the increases in the costs of social security contributions, which rose at a significantly higher rate in 
the East than in the West. Furthermore, increases in costs caused by sick pay, and holidays and holiday 
payments, were of importance. 
 
Table 2: Non-Wage Labour Costs in Manufacturing Industry as % of Direct Compensation 
    West Germany   East Germany 
 1992 2001 1992 2001 
Statutory Non-Wage Labour Costs 35.4 37.1 34.6 37.8 
Employer´s Contribution to Social Security 25.4 28.4 26.2 28.9 
Paid Public Holidays 4.5 5.0 3.7 4.6 
Sickness Payments 5.1 3.3 3.9 3.2 
Other Statutory Allowances 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.1 
Non-Statutory Non-Wage Labour Costs 45.0 44.1 31.7 30.5 
Holiday Payments 19.3 18.6 13.6 15.4 
Special Payments 9.2 8.3 3.9 4.0 
Pension Schemes 7.4 7.7 0.7 1.7 
Capital-Forming Payments 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.4 
Other Non-Wage Labour Costs 7.8 8.4 13.4 9.0 
Total Non-Wage Labour Costs 80.4 81.2 66.3 68.3 
Source: Schröder (2002a); the calculations are based on compensation for hours actually worked. 
 
Table 3 indicates that there is significant variation in wage and non-wage labour costs across 
countries. Hourly labour costs in West German manufacturing amounted to € 26.16 in 2001. This was 
above of all countries compared. A great deal of this difference was due to non-wage labour costs (€ 
11.72 per hour in West Germany). Given this evidence, there is widespread agreement among the 
employers and the main political parties that non-wage labour costs are “far too high” and have to be 
reduced because they drive up labour costs and thus reduce the demand for labour, particularly for 
hard-to-place workers. Firms also claim that uncertainty about the future level of non-wage labour 
                                                 
3 In East German manufacturing industry, annual direct compensation (non-wage labour costs) reached € 18825 
(€ 12855) in 2001 and therefore the share of non-wage labour costs reached 68% of total compensation. Though 
rising, non-wage labour in eastern Germany were still lower than in western Germany. The differences result 
from less generous fringe benefits such as vacation and supplementary pension schemes. 
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costs is an impediment to job creation. Therefore, they form expectations and beliefs on the future 
behaviour of the driving economic variables, which cannot be predicted with certainty. The modelling 
framework has to account for this distinct challenge and has to formalise this issue in a coherent 
economic model.4 
 
Table 3: International Comparison of Hourly Wages in the Manufacturing Industry (2001, in €) 
 Total Hourly 
Wage Costs  
Direct Hourly 
Wages 
Non-Wage 
Labour Costs 
Share of Non-Wage 
Labour Costs in % 
Austria 21.00 10.90 10.10 93 
Belgium 23.15 11.84 11.31 96 
Canada 18.03 13.07 4.97 38 
Denmark 24.50 19.58 4.91 25 
Finland 22.12 12.51 9.61 77 
France 18.93 9.89 9.03 91 
East Germany 16.86 10.09 6.79 68 
West Germany 26.16 14.44 11.72 81 
Greece 8.86 5.27 3.59 68 
Ireland 16.01 11.47 4.54 40 
Italy 15.92 8.14 7.77 96 
Japan 22.22 13.13 9.09 69 
Netherlands 21.98 12.18 9.80 80 
Norway 25.33 17.12 8.22 48 
Portugal 6.75 3.79 2.96 78 
Spain 14.68 8.01 6.67 83 
Sweden 20.91 12.35 8.56 69 
Switzerland 24.96 16.37 8.59 53 
UK 19.23 13.41 5.82 43 
US 22.99 16.57 6.42 39 
Source: Schröder (2002a, 2002b) gives some more details about the calculation of non-wage labour costs. 
International comparisons of non-wage labour costs (“Personalzusatzkosten”) are regularly published by the 
“Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft” in Cologne (see www.iwkoeln.de). The data have been converted into € 
using the average annual exchange rates.  
 
Orthodox theory suggests to calculate the net present value (NPV) of a mooted employment decision. 
When the present value of future profits is bigger than the present value of the costs of hiring a worker 
– that is, the NPV is positive – then go ahead. All employment calculations therefore rely on predicting 
uncertain future profits. But the traditional theory also assumes, implicitly, that employment decisions 
are a now-or-never choice. In many circumstances this is unrealistic and waiting offers a valuable 
chance to learn more about the likely fate of the decision. The ability to delay a partially irreversible 
employment decision is like a financial “call option”. The firm has the right, but not the obligation, to 
                                                 
4 An interesting feature is that some European countries succeeded to restore lower rates of unemployment in the 
1990s despite a high share of non-wage labour costs. A remarkable example for the way out of Europe´s labour 
market misery is the Netherlands. The Dutch employer associations and unions reached a historic agreement on 
wage moderation (the so-called Wassenaar Agreement) in 1992. It turned out that wage moderation was an 
essential ingredient of the Dutch success story. The Dutch experience is consistent with the well-known hump-
shaped relationship between the degree of bargaining coordination and the real wage level of Calmfors and 
 5
buy (hire) a security (new employees) at a specified price (the hiring cost) at a future time of its 
choosing. This option has a value. When the firm makes the investment it exercises (or, in financial 
jargon, “kills”) its option. It follows then, that the cost of that “killed” option (the value of waiting for 
better information) ought to be included when calculating the NPV. Before a hiring decision goes 
ahead, the present value of future profits should exceed the hiring costs by at least the value of keeping 
the real option alive.5 In other words, real options are directly analogous to a traditional American call 
option.6 While real options are similar, the primary distinction is the non-financial nature of the 
underlying asset being acquired.7 
Against this background, the paper proceeds as follows. The application of the real options approach 
to employment determination is sketched in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the simulation results. A 
summary and some policy conclusions are provided in Section 4. Two appendices provide technical 
results used in the body of the paper. 
 
2. Labour Demand and Non-Wage Labour Costs in a Real Options Framework  
 
In valuing real options, one inevitably faces a trade-off between the analytical and computational 
tractability, and the complexity of the underlying model. In the light of this trade-off, academic 
economists have found it convenient to impose sufficient structure on the model to give closed-form 
solution. Following this strategy, we consider a representative firm facing the constant returns to scale 
CES production function 
 
( )[ ] µµµ θθ 11 −−− −+= LKY ,               (1) 
             
where Y denotes output, -1 < µ  < ∞  is the substitution parameters, 10 << θ  is the distribution 
parameters, L is the number of employees, and K is the capital stock. We allow for imperfect 
competition, i.e. we assume that the firm faces an isoelastic demand function 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Driffill (1988) saying that labour markets work best in those countries with either very decentralised or very 
centralised wage formation systems. 
5 In fact, that is usually happening in practice. Firms calculate the NPV, but discount predicted profits using a 
„hurdle“ required rate of return which is much higher than the standard discount rate to account for the 
uncertainty underlying the project. Applying traditional options-pricing theory to employment decisions leads to 
the conclusion that such hurdle rates are perfectly sensible. However, the real options theory allows firms to set 
them on a more rational basis than gut instinct.  
6 A European option can only be exercised on the expiration date whereas an American option can be exercised   
at any time up to and included the expiration date. 
7 The analogy arises because labour adjustment costs are at least partially sunk. Real option theory therefore 
provides an extremely useful method of unlocking the value in employment decisions. The real options literature 
is too vast to survey here. Excellent surveys are provided by Amran and Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001), Coy (1999), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Lander and Pinches (1998). 
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( ) ZYp ψψ−= 1 ,  ψ ≥ 1,                (2) 
 
where p represents the price, Z denotes the demand shock, and ψ is an elasticity parameter that takes 
its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition (see Abel and Eberly, 1994). Therefore, current 
profits, measured in units of output, are defined as 
 
( )[ ] ( )LwLKZ τθθ µψµµ +−−+=Π −−− 11 1 ,            (3) 
 
where τ denotes the ratio of non-wage labour costs to the constant wage, w.8 To keep the model 
simple we abstract from taxes other than those included in the non-wage labour costs. The 
representative risk-neutral firm maximises its discounted flow of profits 
 
( )[ ] ( )∫ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−−+=
∞
−
−
−−
0
1
11max dseLwLKZV rs
L
τθθ µψµµ ,           (4) 
 
where V denotes the intertemporal profit function and r is the real interest rate. To evaluate the impact 
of non-wage labour costs upon labour demand, it is necessary to recognise that production and 
employment are inherently dynamic and uncertain processes. We therefore assume that the stochastic 
demand factor Z follows a geometric Brownian motion  
 
ϖση ZdZdtdZ += ,               (5) 
 
where ϖ  is a Wiener process, dtd εϖ =  (since ε is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), η is the drift term and σ  is the variance parameter. Thus, 
we have an optimal stopping problem – we must determine when it is optimal to hire or fire workers, 
given the stochastic evolution of Z. Additionally, it is assumed that the payroll tax τ follows the 
following jump processes   
 
21 dJdJd +=τ ,               (6) 
 
                                                 
8 Higher taxes on labour will raise the cost of employing someone and will therefore reduce employment to the 
extent that wages do not fall correspondingly. Under competitive markets, wages will fall by the amount of the 
tax increase provided that labour is supplied inelastically. However, labour markets may not be competitive. 
Unions and employers may take tax changes into account when bargaining for wages. Trade unions may, for 
instance, try to shift the higher burden of taxation to employers. So it depends on the bargaining structure at the 
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where 1dJ  and 2dJ  are the increments of Poisson processes (with mean arrival rates λ1 and λ2). It is 
assumed that if an “event 1” (“event 2”) occurs, τ increases (falls) by φ1 (φ2) percent with probability 
1.9 Over each time interval dt there is a probability λ1dt (or λ2dt) that it will rise (drop) by φ1τ (φ2τ). 
Additionally, we assume that (dJ1, dJ2) and dϖ  are orthogonal, i.e. ( ) 01 =dJdE ϖ , ( ) 02 =dJdE ϖ  
and E(dJ1dJ2) = 0. Equations (5) and (6) indicate that there are two sources of uncertainty. Type I 
uncertainty represented by the geometric Brownian motion captures price and/or demand uncertainty. 
Instability of this type may be helpful in predicting the variability in profits. To understand the policy 
impact upon labour demand, we have additionally assumed type II uncertainty (represented by the two 
jump processes). This newly added uncertainty represents political uncertainty about future changes in 
non-wage labour costs and allows investigating how uncertainty about future non-wage labour costs 
alters incentives for employment. In our work, the timing of the potential policy shifts is exogenous.10 
In other words, our model contains two uncorrelated jumps and the behaviour between the jumps is 
that of a „Gaussian“ diffusion („Poisson-Gaussian model“). The critical question for the firm is how 
best to respond in such an uncertain environment.11 Using Itô´s Lemma, the Bellman equation for the 
value V at time zero is   
 
( )[ ] ( )
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]⎭⎬
⎫
−−−−+++
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++−−+=
−
−−
2211
22
1
11
2
1                
11max
φτλφτλσ
ητθθ µψµµ
VVVVVZ
ZVLwLKZrV
ZZ
Z
L           (7) 
 
To find the optimal condition for employees with the existence of firing costs and hiring costs, we 
need to obtain the value of the marginal employed worker first ( )LVv =  and then compare the 
                                                                                                                                                        
labour market and the bargaining power of the parties involved how taxes will affect wages. Given this 
ambiguity, we consider the hourly wage to be exogenous. 
9 Given the high level of unemployment, the German government has implemented an environmental tax reform 
in several stages since 1999 and has used the proceeds to cut employer and employees contributions to the 
pension fund. This policy-induced fall of non-wage labour costs may be represented by „event 2“ in equation (6). 
Environmental taxation is often seen as an attractive solution for cutting unemployment. Such a reform may 
yield a „double dividend“: not only an improvement in environmental quality but also a boost to labour demand. 
The idea of a „double dividend“ has been discussed extensively in the economic literature. Now, the consensus 
view among economists seems to be that a green tax reform is unlikely to generate a significant „double 
dividend“ if previous policies have been economically rational and if other distortions in the economy exist. 
Excellent surveys of the debate are available in Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999).   
10 In practical terms, we are not exploring endogenous uncertainty but exogenous uncertainty that may (or may 
not) be resolved with time but cannot be resolved by action on part of the firm. Alternatively, one could assume 
endogenous uncertainty. Jumps might be correlated because their amplitudes are drawn from correlated 
distributions, or through the correlation in the jump times (the jumps may be simultaneous, or have correlated 
stochastic arrival intensities). This correlated „double-jump“ approach is richer and more complete. A general 
characterisation of such affine jump-diffusions models is available in Duffie et al. (2000). 
11 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) have developed a dynamic model of labour demand with type I uncertainty, but 
have not considered policy uncertainty (type II uncertainty). 
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marginal value of employees with the marginal hiring and firing costs. We take the derivative of (7) 
with respect to L 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]221122 112
1 1, φτλφτλσηδ −−−−+++++−= vvvvvZZvwLKZFrv ZZZ       (8) 
 
and  
 
( ) ( )[ ] 111 11, −−−−−− −+−= µψµµµ θθ
ψ
θ LKLLKF .            (9) 
 
The solution for ( )Zv  consists of the particular integral and the complementary function. We first deal 
with the identification of uncertainty effects in the very special case where hiring and firing costs are 
zero. This special case turns out to be useful as a starting point and for comparisons. Then we turn to 
the general case with positive hiring and firing costs. In the absence of hiring and firing costs, the 
particular integral may be expressed as 
  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∫ +−=
∞
−
0
1, dsewLKZFEZv rsP τ            (10) 
 
which is the expected present value of the marginal employed worker. E[⋅] denotes the expectation 
operator given information at initial time t = 0. This integral can be rewritten as (a proof is given in 
Appendix A) 
 
( ) ( )
2211
,
φλφλ
τ
η +−
−−
−
=
r
w
r
w
r
LKZFZvP .          (11) 
 
The real discount rate for ( )LKZF ,  is η−r  since Z grows at an expected rate of η . The wage, w, is 
exogenous and has a discount rate of r. The current value of τ  has a discount rate adjusted by the 
possibilities of jumps in the future value of τ . 
The firm’s option value of hiring in the future and its option value of firing once the worker is 
employed are measured by the complementary function: 
  
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]221122 112
1 φτλφτλση −−−−+++= vvvvvZZvrv ZZZ .       (12) 
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Letting vG  be the value of the option, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options ( GHv  and 
G
Fv ) have the following forms, respectively (see Appendix B for details), 
 
( ) 11 βZAZvGH =              (13) 
 
and 
 
( ) 22 βZAZvGF = ,             (14) 
 
where β1 and β2 are the positive and negative roots of the following characteristic equation: 
 
( ) 01
2
1 2
=−+− rηβββσ .            (15) 
 
To satisfy the boundary conditions that ( ) 00 =GHv  and ( )∞GFv  = 0, we use the positive solution for GHv  
and the negative solution for GFv .  
We now add fixed marginal hiring (H) and firing (F) costs to the model with both H and F being 
payable by the firm.12 When there are fixed costs of either hiring or firing, the firm will consider the 
option value of maintaining her current position against the alternative of hiring or firing. In other 
words, it should be evident that the hiring and firing policy of the optimising firm is discontinuous. In 
some periods the optimal strategy of the firm will be to adjust the number of workers. Under other 
demand conditions a wait and see attitude will be chosen. More specifically, employment inaction will 
always be chosen when deviations of the expected marginal product of labour from the optimal level 
do not justify the costs of employment adjustment. Hiring and firing costs therefore generate a corridor 
of inaction (wait and see attitude for the time being) within which firms do not change their workforce. 
This region is identified by the upper, ZH, and lower, ZF, control barriers. The definitions of the hiring 
and firing barriers, FH ZZ  and , are given by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions 
below. It is straightforward to show that according to the value-matching conditions the firm would 
find it optimal to exercise its option to hire or fire the marginal worker once Z hits one of the two 
barriers: 
 
( )
12
12
2211
, ββ
φλφλ
τ
η HH
H ZAHZA
r
w
r
w
r
LKFZ
+=+
+−
−−
−
        (16) 
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and 
 
( )
21
21
2211
, ββ
φλφλ
δ
η FF
F ZAFZA
r
w
r
w
r
LKFZ
+=+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−
−−
−
− .       (17) 
 
The left-hand sides of (16) and (17) show the marginal benefit from hiring/firing a worker and the 
right-hand sides the corresponding marginal costs. The marginal benefit of hiring a worker is equal to 
the sum of the present discounted value of his productivity net of wages and the value of the option to 
fire him. The firm’s ability to fire raises the benefit from employing a worker. The marginal cost of 
hiring is the sum of the direct hiring costs and the sacrificed option to hire him in the future. By hiring 
a worker today, the opportunity to do so in the future – when conditions may be more favourable – is 
sacrificed. Similarly, by firing a worker, the opportunity to do so in the future – when demand 
conditions may be even more adverse – is sacrificed, and the opportunity to hire is gained. The 
smooth-pasting conditions ensure that hiring (firing) is not optimal either before nor after the hiring 
(firing) threshold is reached. In technical terms, this means 
 
( ) 1
11
1
22
12, −−
=+
−
ββ ββ
η HH
ZAZA
r
LKF            (18) 
 
and 
 
( ) 1
22
1
11
21, −−
=+
−
−
ββ ββ
η FF
ZAZA
r
LKF .          (19) 
 
Equations (16) - (19) form a non-linear system of equations with four unknown parameters, 
21  and , , Z, AAZ FH , and can be solved numerically once the solutions for β1 and β2 are obtained from 
(15). In order to visualise our approach to employment determination, we next consider calibrations of 
the model. These make the model amenable to graphical analysis. 
 
3. Calibration and Results 
 
The preceding section has laid out the model economy. Having illustrated that the stochastic 
framework has important ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of labour demand, we proceed in 
this section to use the theoretical models derived above to carry out a number of simulations to shed 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 H can be thought of as representing the screening and training costs associated with the recruitment of a new 
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light on the workings of the models and the economic forces at work. 13 For this reason, the model is 
calibrated in order to match characteristics of the German economy. In other words, an intuitive 
interpretation of the model is provided, and throughout the remainder of the paper no background in 
stochastic calculus is necessary to understand the arguments in the text. 
The unit time length corresponds to one year. Our base parameters are σ = 0.15, η = 0.0, 1λ =0.1, 
2λ =0.1, 1φ =0.1, 2φ =0.1, K = 1, r = 0.04, w = 1, H = 0.1, F = 0.6, Ψ = 1.5, µ = 0.4825, θ = 0.3, and τ  
= 0.75. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical labour studies. The firing and 
hiring parameters are consistent with those in Bertolila and Bertola (1990) for Germany. Their 
estimated firing costs for Germany are in the range 0.562 ≤ F ≤ 0.750 and their hiring cost estimate 
(excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 0.066 of the average annual wage. Our specification (H 
= 0.10) is also broadly consistent with the recruiting and training cost of two months in Mortenson and 
Pissarides´ (1999) calibration.14 They suggest that this number is consistent with survey results 
reported in Hamermesh (1993). The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 1/(1+µ) = 0.7 
has been taken from Pissarides (1998). Point estimates for τ have been derived from Table 1. Finally, 
the price elasticity of demand parameter is set at Ψ = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). The 
determination of some parameters, however, requires the use of judgement, i.e. they reflect a back-of-
the-envelope calculation.15 
To motivate the analysis of policy uncertainty, special attention has to be paid to the calibration of the 
Poisson processes. The Poisson process implies that the likelihood of a policy change is determined by 
the arrival rate λ. This means that the time t one has to wait for the switch event to occur is a random 
variable whose distribution is exponential with parameter λ: 
 
{ } e ttbeforeoccurseventprobtF λ−−=≡ 1)( .          (20) 
 
The corresponding probability density is 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
employee and F as the severance costs imposed by legislation when dismissing an employee.  
13 The numerical boundary value problem is solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. 
For a description of the algorithm used to compute the numerical simulations, see Press et al. (2002). 
14 Firing costs have increased substantially in Germany in the late 1960s and 1970s and have roughly stayed on 
this high level since then (see Caballero and Hammour, 1997). The OECD (1999) has compiled a comprehensive 
dataset describing legislative firing (procedural requirements, notification periods, severance pay, special 
requirements for collective dismissals, and short-time work schemes) and hiring costs (rules favouring 
disadvantaged groups, conditions for temporary and fixed-term contracts, training requirements) covering 22 
indicators for 27 countries. These 22 indicators provide the inputs for the construction of cardinal summary 
indicators of employment protection across countrties. These indicators of strictness of employment protection in 
the late 1990s are also available in the DICE database (for further details, see www.cesifo.de). 
15 Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of 
various labour market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of a partial equilibrium 
model and to identify key features of the framework in determining the policy´s quantitative impact. 
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e ttFtf λ λ−=′≡ )()( .             (21) 
 
In other words, the probability that the event will occur sometime within the short interval between t0 
and t0+dt is approximately λe-λtdt. In particular, the probability that it will occur within dt from now 
(when t = 0) is approximately λdt. In this sense λ is the probability per unit of time. Moreover, the 
number of policy changes (x) that will take place over any interval of length ∆ is distributed according 
to the Poisson distribution 
 
(22)  { } ( )
!
)(
x
occureventxprobxg e
x ∆−∆
=≡
λλ  
 
whose expected value is the arrival rate times the length of the interval λ∆. We can back out from 
equation (22) the agent´s beliefs about policy changes. As a guide to calibration, Table 4 below 
provides the probabilities that either one (x = 1) or three (x = 3) jumps will occur within 5 years (∆ = 
5) or 10 years (∆ = 10) for the four arrival rates λ = 0.01, λ = 0.05, λ = 0.10 and λ = 0.15, respectively. 
For example, for λ = 0.05 the probability that one jump will occur within 5 years is 19.5 percent.  
 
Table 4: Jump Probabilities for the Poisson Process 
 λ = 0.01  λ = 0.05 λ = 0.10 λ = 0.15 
prob{1 event in 5 years} 0.048 0.195 0.303 0.354 
prob{3 events in 5 years} 0.000002 0.002 0.013 0.033 
prob{1 event in 10 years} 0.090 0.303 0.368 0.395 
prob{3 events in 10 years} 0.0001 0.012 0.061 0.126 
 
Given the high probability of increasing non-wage labour costs in Germany, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed over the grid λi ∈ {0.0,0.2} for i = 1,2. 
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Figure 1: The Employment Thresholds for Alternative Hiring and Firing Costs 
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First, we consider a policy which changes hiring and firing costs. Despite the fact that liberalisation of 
labour markets has ranked highly in European policy debates, few effective changes to the stringent 
nature of the employment constraints facing European firms appear to have been implemented over 
the last decade. Moreover, in a number of European countries the general trend towards greater 
employment protection would actually appear to have continued. The numerical results are given in 
Figure 1. The major result of the calibrations is that higher hiring and firing costs lead to an increase of 
the no action area, i.e. increasing hiring and/or firing increases the hiring threshold (ZH) and decreases 
the firing threshold (ZF). On the one hand, protection dampens unemployment because existing 
workers are fired less easily. On the other hand, it increases unemployment as employers are more 
reluctant to hire highly protected workers. The net impact upon employment turns out to be negative 
because the hiring thresholds are steeper, compared to the firing ones. This asymmetric widening of 
the region of inaction implies that German unemployment is caused not so much by an increased 
probability of loosing one´s job, but rather by a reduction in the probability of finding a job when one 
is unemployed.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 This feature is consistent with the empirical evidence in Bean (1994), p. 576. More indirectly, countries where 
employment is protected tend also to discourage business start-ups. Fonseca et al. (2001) have shown that 
impediments to firm formation are strongly and negatively correlated with the employment to population ratio. 
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Figure 2: The Impact of the Level of Non-Wage Labour Costs Upon the Thresholds  
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Figure 2 investigates numerically the impact of higher non-wage costs levels. The graph clearly 
indicates that a higher share of non-wage labour costs (τ) leads to an increase of ZH and ZF and a 
widening of the wait and see area. 
Figure 3 provides a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to λ1 and λ2, i.e. we illustrate the 
impact of uncertainty about future non-wage labour costs upon the optimal hiring and firing 
thresholds. Alternatively, one may say that we consider different degrees of „policy-jumpiness“. The 
3-D graphs clearly indicate the entire no-action areas. If λ1 increases, then the ZH  investment threshold 
will rise – firms will be more reluctant to hire to avoid getting caught with too much workers, should 
the future turn out worse than expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the 
firm can just hire more workers as needed. The implication is that the textbook net present value rule 
is blatantly inappropriate in any context other than the unrealistic setting where sunk costs are 
negligible and there is certainty regarding the determinants of the profitability of the project to be 
undertaken. On the contrary, if λ2 increases, then the ZH threshold declines. In other words, uncertainty 
about future non-wage labour costs pushes up the real option “price” and increases the advantages to 
the firm of waiting. The theory therefore explains why firms often respond slowly to changes in policy 
variables – all of which, orthodox theory suggests, should elicit an instant response. 
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Figure 3: The Impact of 1λ  and 2λ  Upon the Thresholds 
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Figure 4: The Threshold Values as a Function of φ1  
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Figure 4 shows how the magnitude of the jumps (represented by φ1) affects the thresholds. Two main 
messages emerge from Figure 4. The first concerns the hiring and firing thresholds: The simulations 
suggest that perceived upside risks act as an important deterrent to hirings and firings. Pari passu, an 
unreliable political environment translates into higher thresholds and hence lowers the efficiency of 
the economy. 
Let us now consider changes in σ. In other words, we analyse the sensitivity of the optimal thresholds 
with respect to changes in the volatility of the geometric Brownian motion representing demand and/or 
price uncertainty. As in the existing literature, we find that the threshold value at which hiring takes 
place is increasing in the “noisiness” level even though the firm is risk neutral. In volatile 
environments, the best tactic is to keep options open and await new information rather than take an 
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employment decision today. The intuition is that the firm can counteract the impact from additional 
uncertainty by a wait and see attitude for the time being. 
 
Figure 5: The Threshold Values as Function of σ 
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Figure 6: The Impact of τ Upon the Labour Demand Curve 
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In order to gain additional insight into the model, Figure 6 shows how non-wage labour costs affect 
the labour demand schedule. We investigate τ = 0.8 and τ = 0.6. For each parameterisation, the hiring 
and firing employment thresholds are derived for Z = 3.5 with the fact that marginal values of 
employees from particular solutions are the same with Z and L thresholds. The firm would hire a 
marginal worker if the employment falls below HL ; and the firm would fire a marginal employee if 
the employment level is more than FL . The comparison of the curves reveals that higher non-wage 
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labour costs reduce labour demand. This again highlights the interdependencies between labour 
markets and a social security system which is tied to employment. 
The traditional literature has often focused exclusively on the impact of certain labour market 
regulations, largely ignoring the role of product market regulations and the interactions between 
regulatory interventions in the two markets. In recent years, however, an increasing literature 
analysing such interactions has emerged (see, for example, the careful discussion in Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2003).  As a step ahead in the analysis, we therefore provide an initial attempt to quantify 
such interactions. Policies in product and labour markets are normally aimed at influencing outcomes 
in the markets to which they directly apply. However, the empirical and theoretical findings of various 
recent papers suggest that policy interactions between product and labour markets can have important 
effects, sometimes even having an impact comparable to within-market policy influences. For 
instance, in some European countries, anticompetitive product market regulations and strict 
employment protection policies appear to have contributed equally to keeping employment rates low 
(see Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002, Fonseca et al., 2001, Nicoletti et al., 2001 and Nickell, 1999).17 
How do alternative patterns of regulations in product markets influence the hiring and firing decisions 
of firms in our modelling framework? In the simulations below, we think of the regulatory stance on 
the product markets as being captured, admittedly in abstract fashion, by the degree of product market 
competition, ψ. The aim of the simulations is to assess the policy relevance of cross-market effects 
from product markets to labour markets.   
 
Figure 7: Hiring and Firing Thresholds as a Function of ψ 
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Figure 7 plots the employment thresholds as a function of ψ. As expected, anticompetitve product 
market regulations are found to increase the employment thresholds and to widen the inaction range. 
The cross-market interaction results therefore suggest that strict product market regulation is likely to 
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affect employment negatively.18 Despite its preliminary character, the analysis thus suggests that 
accounting for cross-market effects is an important element of good policy design and the removal of 
barriers to competition in potentially competitive markets can be a complement to labour market 
reforms.19  
 
4. Summary Remarks and Conclusions 
 
Germany has one of the highest unemployment rates – 11.% or 4.5 million people – in the rich 
world.20 Against this gloomy background, chancellor Schröder and his government have taken some 
encouraging steps in their “Agenda 2010”. Most strikingly they have proposed substantial cuts in the 
duration and amounts of unemployment and non-wage labour costs (sickness benefits). The 
government has also suggested ways that would weaken job-protection in small companies and 
encourage employers to hire new workers. In detail, the government has agreed to make firing rules 
more flexible by letting small firms take on a sixth worker – or more – on a fixed-term contract 
without the other employees becoming eligible for full job protection. In larger firms, the government 
proposes offering anyone laid off a choice between a fixed amount of compensation, not automatically 
available at present, and seeking redress in the courts, in which case the worker would have to 
renounce all rights to financial compensation. This procedure would help to avoid the long, 
unpredictable and costly legal proceedings that always follow any attempt to lay off workers in 
Germany. Furthermore, the government says it will encourage wage bargaining at the company level 
by making it easier for firms to opt out of the straitjacket of sector-wide agreements when 
circumstances so require. Above all, the government is determined to reduce the non-wage costs of 
labour. Of course, the model developed in this paper is stylised and may not capture all of the details. 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 A set of indicators of various dimensions of product market regulation shedding some light on cross-country 
differences is available at http://www.cesifo.de/pls/diceguest/search.create_simple_search_page. 
18 The larger inaction range probably represents a lower bound, in that we take the wage, w, as given when 
looking at changes in ψ. In practice, many regulation measures are likely to increase w as well. From a theoreti-
cal standpoint, there is a strong presumption that regulatory provisions and a lack of competition will induce an 
upward pressure in wage rates.      
19 There are at least three channels through which the strictness of product market regulations may have 
implications for labour markets. (1) Product market deregulation increases competitive pressures among firms, 
raising the elasticity of product demand. At the firm level, for given wages, a higher demand elasticity raises 
labour demand; (2) product market deregulation lowers entry costs. This is likely to lead to higher employment; 
(3) a more competitive institutional setting will also contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy 
through thriving entrepreneurial activity (Acemoglu et al., 2002). While the intensity of these effects will depend 
also on the features of labour market institutions, their sign will generally remain the same across different 
institutional settings. This leads to the „all or nothing“ warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag 
and Snower (1998). They argue that piecemeal labour market reforms may have had so little success because 
they disregarded the complementarities between a broad range of policies and institutions. 
20 Germany´s labour market institutions have by and large been kept unchanged over the last thirty years. 
Therefore, their interaction with changes in the economic environment is the most plausible candidate for 
explaining rising unemployment. Economic conditions have become more volatile over the last ten years due to 
globalisation and the transition to the new economy. This explanation is in fact the gist of papers by Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000), Chen et al. (2002) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002). 
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Nevertheless, the modelling exercise clearly indicates that such a reform package – if boldly and fully 
implemented – will push Germany in the right direction. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (11) 
 
Assume that the particular solution for the shadow price of employees has the following functional 
form as the particular integral components: 
 
( ) τDwCwLKBZFv ++= , .           (A1) 
 
Then, we have  
 
( )LKBZFZvZ ,ηη = ,            (A2) 
 
0=ZZv ,             (A3) 
 
( )( )[ ] 1111 1 τφλφτλ Dwvv =−+ ,           (A4) 
 
( )( )[ ] 2222 1 τφλφτλ Dwvv =−− .          (A5) 
 
Substituting into equation (8) yields 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
11, 1,,,
τφλ
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Dw
DwLKBZFwNLKZFDwCwLKBZFr
−
+++−=++
.     (A6) 
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ( )[ ] 0111, 2211 =++−+++−− DrwrCwBrLKZF φλφλτη .      (A7) 
  
Equation (A8) must hold for any value of B, C, and D, so that  
 
η−
=
r
B 1 ,             (A8) 
 
r
C 1−= ,             (A9) 
 
2211
1
φλφλ +−
−
=
r
D           (A10) 
 
It is then straightforward to obtain equation (11). 
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Appendix B: Derivation of Equations (13) and (14) 
 
The homogeneous solutions to equation (12) should have the same components as the particular 
solutions with respect to the uncertainty variables. Assume the homogeneous solutions have the 
functional form 
 
τβ BAZv += .                (B1) 
 
Then we have 
 
βηβη AZZvZ = ,              (B2) 
 
( ) βββσσ AZvZ ZZ 12
1
2
1 222
−= ,            (B3) 
 
( )( )[ ] 1111 1 τφλφτλ Bvv =−+ ,            (B4) 
 
( )( )[ ] 2222 1 τφλφτλ Bvv =−− ,            (B5) 
 
Now substitute into equation (12) in the text. It is straightforward to obtain the following characteristic 
equation: 
 
( ) ( ) 22112 121 τφλτφλββσηβτ βββ BBAZAZCBAZr −+−+=++        (B6) 
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
 
( ) 01
2
1
2211
2
=−+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+− τφλτφλτηβββσ β BBrBAZrr        (B7) 
 
Equation (B7) must hold for any value of A, B, and C.  Thus, we have 
 
( ) 01
2
1 2
=−+− rηβββσ             (B8) 
 
2211 τφλτφλτ BBrB −=             (B9) 
 
Note that (B9) holds only if B = 0. Actually, the jump uncertainty is captured in the particular 
solutions and therefore does not appear in the homogenous solutions. Therefore only equation (B8) 
consists of homogenous solutions. Note that there are two roots for characteristic equation (B8). 
Therefore, the general solutions are denoted by 
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ββ ZAZAvG += ,           (B10) 
 
where 01 >β  and 02 <β . 
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